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THE LEGALITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CASES:
THE WORLD COURT SITS ON THE FENCE
Vikram Raghavan*

On the 8th of July, 1996, the International Court of Justice (ICI) delivered
verdicts! on the twin requests for an advisory opinion made through resolutions of
the World Health Assembly (WHA) of the World Health Organisation (WHO)2 and
the General Assembly of the United Nations (General Assembly).3 The Court
declined to pronounce on the queries of the former, due to its finding that the WHO
had no competence to make the request.4 But in a sharply divided verdict, in
answering the reference of the General Assembly, the Court declared that "the threat
or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international
law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of
humanitarian law." The Court, however could not conclude definitively whether the
threat of use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme
circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at
stake.s The ruling of the Court is bound to have important implications for
international law, the environment and global peace and security. This article is a

>I<

V Year B.A., LL.B., (Hons.)., National Law School of India University. I am most grateful to Mr.
Katsuyuki Yano, a survivor of the nuclear bombing during World War II in Japan for making
available a copy of the recent decisions of the International Court of Justice that are commented
upon in this paper. Needless to say without his help this paper could not have been completed. I
must also express my thanks to Mr. T.S. Suresh, Advocate, Madras High Court for his comments
on an earlier draft. All errors are entirely mine.
Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996ICJ
_ ("Opinion on WHO Request"); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 ICJ - ("Opinion on General Assembly Request") (Jul. 8 1996). As the official
published version of the Court's opinions were not available at the time of writing, the paragraph
numbers in this article refer to a non consecutively paginated unofficial version in electronic
database (on file with the author). A comprehensive summary of the salient features of the
judgments, including the dissents and separate opinions are available in an unofficial communique
of the Court, prepared by its Registry for the use of the press. see, Communique Of The
International Court Of Justice, No. 96/22 and 96/23 (Jut8, 1996) (on file at the Library, National
Law School of India University).

2
3

Health and Environmental Effects of Nuclear Weapons, WHA Res. 46.40 (May 14, 1993).
G.A. Res. 75, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/699 (1994).

4

Opinion on WHO Request, supra n. 1 at para. 35. The opinion of the Court was divided eleven votes
to three. Those in favour of the ruling that it was unable to give the advisory opinion requested
of it under the WHA resolution, were President Bedjaoui, Vice President Stephen Schwebel, Judges
Oda, Guillaume, Ranjeva, Herczecgh, Fleishhauer, Vereshchetin, Ferrari Bravo and Rosalyn
Higgins. Those against were Judges Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry and Koroma.

5

Opinion on General Assembly Request, supra, n. I at para. 105 (E). The Court was divided seven
to seven on this key question. Those inJavour of the verdict consisted of President Bedjaoui, Judges
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modest attempt to analyse the opinions of the Court.6 Part A will trace the
background for the advisory opinions. Part B will examine the judgment on the
request made by the WHA. Part C will highlight the salient features and comment
on the verdict of the Court in respect of the request made by the General Assembly.
The discussion in Part D will concern the Court's ruling on its competence to
entertain the General Assembly's queries. Part E will deal with the formulation of
the question posed and the law that the Court felt would apply. Part F will endeavour
to explore the Court's interpretation of the general prohibition on the threat or use
of force contained in the Charter of the United Nations (U.N. Charter). Part G looks
to the Court's opinion in relation to customary and conventional international law.
While Part H will seek to estimate the Court's observations on International
Humanitarian Law, Part I will do so with respect to the principle of neutrality. The
conclusions of the Court derived through the application of the rules of armed
conflict and international humanitarian law will be analysed in Part J. Part K
concerns itself with pronouncement of the Court with respect to the obligation to
negotiate .nuclear disarmament and its consequent impact on treaties like the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleishhauer, Vereshchetin and Ferrari Bravo. Those against were Vice
President Schwebel, Judges ada, Guillaume, Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Koroma and Higgins.
It was adopted as the majority opinion when President Mohammed Bedjaoui, cast a second tie
breaking vote as allowed by the rules of the Court. But this does not mean that the Justices of the
World Court were divided equally on the legality or otherwise of Nuclear Weapons. TIrree of the
dissenting judges, Weeramantry, Koroma and Shahabuddeen felt that the Court had not gone far
enough when it qualified its verdict by expressing its inability to rule on the legality of weapons
6 For literature on the Court's opinions, see, M.Moore, The World Court says mostly no to Nuclear
Weapons, Bull. Atom. Scin'ts. 39 (Sep-Oct 1996) (narrating in brief the story of the World Court
project and commenting on the judgment); P. Weiss, And now, Abolition, Ibid. at 42 (calling for
concerted efforts to be made towards proceeding toward complete abolition through negotiations);
J.J. Stone, Less than meets the Eye, Ibid. at 43 (criticising the verdict for asking less than the nuclear
powers have already undertaken); M. Krepon, The Counter-Revolution, Ibid. at 45. (hailing the
judgment as a milestone in countering the use or'nuclear weapons), Kathleen Bailey, So "(hat, Ibid.
at 46 (expressing scepticism about the impact that the Court's decision will have on banning
nuclear weapons) V.S. Mani, Nuclear Arms & the World Court, The Hindu, Bangalore (Oct. 28,
1996) (stating that on more than one count, the ICJ has failed in its role as the principal judicial
organ of the international community). For literature that discusses the run-up to the judgment of
the Court and the issues that were raised before it, see generally, N. Grief, The World Court Project
On Nuclear Weapons And International Law (1992); (narrating the history of the World Court
Project) L.M. Marks & H.H. Weller, Is the Use of Nuclear Weapons Illegal?, N. Y.L. J. I (Jul.
11, 1994) (explaining why·the Court should hear and pronounce on the request that nuclear
weapons are indeed illegal); N.Rostow, The World Health Organisation, the International Court
of Justice, and Nuclear Weapons. 20 Yale J. Int'I. L. 151 (1995); (concerned with the lack of
competence of the WHO in seeking the opinion of the Court and generally expressing the view
that international law contains no specific prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons) V.Raghavan,
The Legality of Nuclear Weapons: Dilemma before the World Court, Econ. & Pol. Wkly. (July,
6, 1996) (arguing that the Court should not decline to hear the request and discussing various facets
concerned with the illegality of nuclear weapons). For an account of the arguments and proceedings
in the case, see, J.Burroughs & J.Cabasso, Nukes on Trial, Bull. Atom. Scin'ts. 41 (Mar/Apr 1996).
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A. THE WORW COURT PROJECT
It is noteworthy that Judge Nagendra Singh, India's nominee on the International Cour~ of Justice for more than a decade was one of the first to suggest that
the use of nuclear weapons was illegal.7 He did so at a time when the world was
still coming to understa.'1d the full implications of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki
bombings,8 but unfortunately was not able to convert his thesis into judicial dicta.
Through the decades of the cold war, when the superpowers engaged in a stand off
in which the possession of nuclear weapons was viewed as a deterrent against each
other, academia in international law largely avoided addressing this important
question albeit with certain exceptions.9 Richard Falk in trying to explain this
phenomenon stated that if Japan or Germany had developed and used atomic bombs
in W orld War II against the inhabited cities of the victors, the war crimes trials held
in Nuremberg or Tokyo would have certainly investigated, condemned the use of
the weapons and punished those who had been responsible for its use.lO But
gradually efforts got underway through the aegis of the United Nations, which
passed resolutions,11 and set up the Conference on Disarmamentl2 to move toward
an end of the nuclear arms race and even aim for a total elimination of weapons.
These efforts gathered some momentum as the detente took root, super powers also
endeavoured to reduce their weapon banks, but they still retained vast quantities of

7

N. Singh, Nuclear Weapons And International Law (1959).

8

See generally, Paust, The Nuclear Decision in World War II - Truman's Ending and Avoidance
of War, 8 Int'1. Law. 160 (1974). For a view that at the time when the bombs were dropped the
allies, particularly the United States believed that the their use was lawful, see, Rostow, supra n.
6 at 178 - 180.

9

See, Singh, supra n. 7. G. Schwarzenberger, The Legality Of Nuclear Weapons (1958); Brownlie,
Some Legal Aspects of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 141nt'1. & Compo L.Q. 437 (1965); McDougal
& Felicano, International Coercion and World Public Order: The General Principles of the Law
of War, 67 Yale LJ. 771 (1958); Maggs, The Soviet Viewpoint on Nuclear Weapons and
International Law, 29 Law & Contemp. Probs. 956 (1964).
10 R.A. Falk, Towards a Legal Regime for Nuclear Weapons in Miller & Freidrider, infra n. 22 at
107, 110. The attacks against Hiroshima and Nagasaki did become the subject ofajudicial
decision
in Shimoda v. The State (Japanese Government), 8 Japan Annote Int'l. L. 212 (1964). The Tokyo
District Court was petitioned for damage by persons affected the bombings. After concluding that
the attacks were illegal for they were in violation of the laws of war, the Court found that the
plaintiffs were without remedy for Japan had waived all its claims in this respect under the terms
of the surrender in 1945. For a comment on this decision See, R.A. Falk The Shimoda Case: A Legal

Appraisal of the Atomic Attacks Upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 59 Am. J. Int'!. L. 759 (1965).
M.Mcdougal & F.Felicano, Law And Minimum World Order 659-68 (1969) (generally expressing
support for the use of nuclear weapons).
II Declaration

on the Prohibition

of the Use of Nuclear and Thermo-nuclear

1653, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17)
and Prevention of Nuclear War, G.A.
2/33/45 (1978); G.A.Res. 35/152-0,
(1980); See also, G.A. Res. 2162A,

Weapons,

G.A. Res.

at 4, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961); Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons
Res. 33171-B, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.45) at 48, U.N. Doc.
35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 69, U.N.Doc. A/35/48
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.16), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).

12 See generally, The United Nations General Assembly And The Disarmament (1989): The United
Nations And Disarmament: A Short History (1988).
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nuclear armaments enough to explode the planet several times over.13 By 1968, the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)14 which was among prominent initiatives
to reduce nuclear use, though its provisions were highly controversial, was opened
for signature.15 In 1974, the IeJ was confronted with the nuclear issue, through the
Nuclear Tests Casesl6 which were actions brought by Australia and New Zealand
against France complaining of the detrimental effect of the latter's atmospheric
testing of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific. The World Court however 'ducked'
the question by preferring to rely on the statements made by French leaders to the
effect that they would not conduct any more nuclear tests. According to the Court
this was a unilateral decalartion that was binding on FranceP However, the very
next year France conducted two tests in the South Pacific. Since then it conducted
more than one hundred and forty seven tests until it signed the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT).18 In para. 63 of its judgment, the Court stated that the if the
basis for its judgment was to be affected, the applicant could request an examination
of the situation in accordance with the provisions of the Statute. This was used as
the basis for New Zealand to re-commence proceedings against France in 1995 in
respect of the latter' s underground testing of nuclear weapons.19 The Court,
however, declined to pass any order on this request for it found that its judgment
in 1974 had been in respect of atmospheric testing and consequently did not apply
to underground testing.2o Nonetheless the Court stated that its order was without
prejudice to the obligations of states to respect and protect the natural environment,21

13 See, Weston, Falk and D' Amato, International Law And World Order 1000 - 1002 (1990).
14 Treaty on the Non Proliferation

of Nuclear Weapons,

729 UNTS 161.

15 For literature on the NPT see, S.M. Keeny Jr., The NPT: A Global Success Story, Arms Control
Today 3 (March, 1995); J.Mendelson & D.Lockwood, The Nuclear Weapon States and Art. VI of
the NPT, Arms Control Today II (March, 1995); W.Epstein & P.e. Sasz, Extension of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, 33 Vir. 1. In1'l. 1. 756 (1994);

16 Nuclear Test Cases (Australia v. France) (New Zealand v. France),

1974ICJ

135.

17 For a critique of the juristic method that the Court adopted in deciding these cases, see, T.M.
Franck, The Decision of the ICJ in the Nuclear Tests Cases, 69 Am. J. In1'l. 1. 612 (1975).
18 See, Fifty - One Years of Nuclear Testing: The Final Tally? Arms Control Today 38 (Aug 1996)

19 See, New Zealand's
of the Court's

Request for an Examination of the Situation in accordance with Paragraph 63
1973 Judgment on the Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France), 1995 ICJ 288

at para. 64.
20 Judge Weeramantry appended
admittedly the Court's verdict
in the atmosphere, the cause
much the same. The damage
was that the weapons were
Weeramantry).

a strong dissent to the order of the Court where he stated that though
was on the technically with respect to the nuclear testing conducted
of New Zealand's complaint against underground testing was very
was the same being radioactive contamination. The only difference
being detonated underground. Ibid. (separate opinion of Judge

21 Judge Weeramantry stated that important principles of environmental law were involved in the
case, such as the precautionary principle, the principle that the burden of proving safety lies on
the author of the act complained of, and the intergenerational
principle relating to the rights of
future generations. He regretted that the Court had not availed itself of the opportunity to consider
these principles, see ibid. at 342.
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The first serious moves to obtain a comprehensive legal ruling on the illegality
of the weapons as a whole, were made by international legal scholars writing on the
topic in the 1980s.22 These moves were accompanied by the formation of an
association called the Lawyer's Committee on Nuclear Policy in New York to
promote awareness about the illegality of nuclear weapons. In 1989, another
organisation, the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms
(IALANA) was formed. In 1992, the IALANA along with the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and International Peace Bureau formed the
World Court Project. 23 Its aim was to generate opinion in order to persuade the
World Court to give a ruling on the illegality of Nuclear Weapons.24 The strategy
that was agreed involved convincing enough nations to move a resolution in the
WHA and the General Assembly seeking the ICI' s opinion on the matter. This was
no doubt a wise decision for a general question such as the one posed to the Court,25
by the two international organisations could not have been made by a one nation
single handedly.26 Advisory opinions can only be requested by the General

22 R.Falk, E.Meyrowitz & J.Sanderson, Nuclear Weapons and International Law, 20 Ind. J. Int'1. L.
541 (1980) (making out a claim for the abolition of nuclear weapons based on natural law and
human rights .Jaw);Weston, Nuclear Weapons Versus International Law: A Contextual Reassessment, 28 McGill L.1. 542 (1983) (applying humanitarian law to suggest that nuclear weapons are
illegal) ; Two collections important pieces that contain substantial arguments on the illegality of
nuclear weapons were published in 1984 and 1987 respectively, see, A.S. Miller & M. Feidrider
(eds.), Nuclear Weapons And The Law (1984); I.Pogany (Ed.), Nuclear Weapons And International
Law (1987). Other important wor!;sinclude,; J.Fried, Law and Nuclear War, 38 Bull. Atom. Scin't.
67 (June 1982); Paust, Controlling Prohibited Weapons and the Illegal Use of Permitted Weapons,
28 Mc Gill L. Rev. 609 (1983) (calling for the ban on the further development ofnuclear technology
in the light of international legal prohibitions)E.L. Meyrowitz, The Law of War and Nuclear
Weapons, 9 Brook. J. Int'1. L. 227 (1983); (the use of nuclear weapons are unlawful in international
law); The Opinions of Legal Scholars on the Legal Status of Nuclear Weapons, 24 Stan. J. Int'1.
L. III (1987) (a compendium of the views of many publicists convinced that nuclear weapons
are illegal); B.H. Weston, Nuclear Weapons and International Law: Illegality in Context, \3 Denv.
1. Int'1. L.& Pol' y. I (1983) (making out a case for the illegality of nuclear weapons in light of
humanitarian law). D.M. Corwin, The Legality of Nuclear Weapons Under International Law, 5
Dick. J. Int'1. L. 271 (1987) (opining that all uses of nuclear weapons are unlawful). B.S. Chimni,
Nuclear Weapons and International Law: Some Reflections in R.P. Dhokalia (Ed.), International
Law In Transition: Essays In Honour Of Nagendra Singh (1989) (making a strident case bordering
in jurisprudential theory for the outlawing of nuclear weapons). P. Weiss, Nuclear Weapons for
Non-Lawyers in TowanisA Nuclear-Free And Non-Violent World 327 (1990) (explaining in non
technical terms why intemationallaw forbids the use of nuclear weapons).
23 See, Moore, supra n. 6 at 40.
24 See, Grief, supra n. 6.
25 See, text accompanying nn. 33 & 34.
26 The cases before the World Court other than advisory opinions or matters connected with the
United Nations, are those involving sovereign nations. This is apparent from the Statute of the
International Court of Justice ("Statute"), which indicates that only states may be parties in cases
before the Court, Statute Of The International Court Of Justice ("Statute"), Art. 34.

Vol. 9]

The Legality of Nuclear Weapons Cases

35

Assembly or a specialised agency.27 Even if a nation was to seek an opinion on the
question from the Court it would have to file the case against a power that possessed
nuclear weapons or all the atomic weapon powers by demonstrating that it was
affected in some manner or that it was ventilating a cause, 'erga omnes' .28 This
would have been rather difficult to establish. Further the respondent nations would
have to consent to the jurisdictio under arts. 36 (1) or (2) of The Statute. Therefore
seeking an advisory opinion was perhaps the best way to approach the problem for
the activists involved in the World Court Project.29
In their quest to get an answer from the ICI, the World Health Organisation
was the natural choice of the World Court Project activists. This was because of the
extensive work that the organisation had done in studying the health effects of

27 Art. 94 of the Charter of the United Nations ("Charter")

states:

1.

The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International
to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.

2.

Other organs of the United Nations and specialised agencies, may at any time be so authorised
by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions arising within the scope of their
activities.

Charter of the United Nations ("Charter"),
It is also relevant

Court of Justice

Art. 94.

at this stage to extract, Art. 65 of the Statute;

1.

The Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body
may be authorised by or in accordance with the Chapter of the United Nations to make such
a request.

2.

Questions upon which the advisory opinion of the Court is asked shall be laid before the Court
by means of a written request containing an exact statement of the question upon which an
opinion is required, and accompanied by all documents likely to throw light upon the question.

Statute,

Art. 65.

28 By this is meant that all nations have a legal interest in pursuing a remedy against another nation
for its violation of an obligation that is universal. The applicant for relief need not demonstrate
that it was personally affected by the actions of the respondent. But very few concepts have been
recogni~ed in the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice as possessing erga onmes
character. In an advisory opinion;n 1951, the Court recognised a universal obligation akin to erga
onmes in relation to the principles underlying the Geneva Conventions on Warfare; see, Reservations to the Convention on Genocide (Advisory Opinion), 1951 ICJ 15. In the Barcelona Traction
Case, where the concept was first discussed the Court named as the outlawing of aggression,
genocide, the principles of the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery
and racial discrimination as possessing these norms, see, Barcelona Traction Light and Power Co.
Ltd., 1970 ICJ 3 at 32. In the cases under review, it would have been possible for a nation to contend
that it had standing to contest the validity of nuclear weapons against those who possessed the
weapons, for their devastating consequences which would clearly lead to a violation of the
obligations erga omnes by the nations concerned. For comment on the general concept of Erga
Onmes and its relation to humanitarian laws and the laws of warfare, see, Th.Meron, Human Rights
And Humanitarwn Norms As Customary International Law 188 (1988).
29 The World Court Project was also perhaps concerned that a contentious case filed against another
nation might end in the manner that the Nuclear Tests Case ended, see, text accompanying nn. 16

- 19.
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nuclear weapons.3D The organisation had the capacity to request the International
Court of Justice for an advisory opinion 'on legal questions arising out of its
competence' by virtue of an agreement with the United Nations in this regard under
Art. 94 of the Charter.31 Through this arrangement, the World Court had once before
answered a question put to it by the WHO.32 By 1993, the advocates of the World
Project were assured of enough support for their plan among WHO members to get
a reference to the World Court and accordingly a resolution to this effect was moved
in the WHA. It was opposed by some nations particularly the United States of
America, but it was passed at the 'B" Committee and then by the Assembly in
general session.33 The resolution asked the Court the following question, " In view
of the health and environmental effects, would the use of nuclear weapons by a State
in war or other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations under international law
including the WHO Constitution?,,34 Not satisfied, the World Court Project activists
lobbied members of the world's most representative body, the General Assembly.
Their plan in this regard was to get the First Committee of the General Assembly
to request the General Assembly to seek an advisory opinion. They were successful
in their endeavour primarily, because of the support of the non-aligned movement. 35
The scene then shifted to the General Assembly which on the December 23, 1994
adopted a resolution, which inter alia referred to the WHA resolution discussed
earlier and asked the World Court, the following question "Is the threat or use of
nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?" 36 The
World Court commenced hearing submissions on these requests in the Fall of 1995
and an unprecedented number of nations apart from the WHO gave their views to
the Court.37 The deliberations of the Court to finalise the judgment were considerably long judging from the fact that the opinion which was originally scheduled to

30 See. World Health Organisation, Effects Of Nuclear War On Health And Health Services (1984)
& (1987); Health and Environmental Effects of Nuclear Weapons, WHA 46.30 (Apr. 26, 1993);
Programme of Work of the Health Assembly, WHA 45/1992/REC/3 (May 12, 1992).
31 See, Agreement between the United Nations and the World Health Organisation, Aug. 8, 1947 U.N.
-WHO, 1911I U.N.T.S. 193. (This agreement entered into force on July 10, 1948).
32 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, 1980 ICJ 73.
(Here the Court rendered an opinion on the question as to the legal principles and rules applicable
in relation to the transfer of the Regional Office of the WHO from Egypt to Jordan as sought by
certain Arab States, in the wake of the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty).
33 See, Rostow, supra n. 6 at 138-39.
34 Health and Environmental

Effects of Nuclear Weapons. WHA Res. 46.40 (May 14, 1993).

35 See, M. Schapiro, Mutiny on the Nuclear Bounty: Non Aligned Nations, The Nation 798 (Dec. 27,
1993).
36 G.A. Res. 75, U.N.GAOR,

49th Sess., U.N.Doc.

37 See, Moore, supra n. 6 at 40.

A/699 (1994).
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be delivered in March of 1996 was postponed to July of the same year.38 From the
sharp divisions in the verdict the reason for this is apparent.

B. THE WHO REFERENCli
The Jurisdiction of the Court in an Advisory Opinion
The WHO reference which was rejected by the Court will be analysed in this
part. The Justices of the Court were less fractured in this judgment than they were
in relation to the opinion on the General Assembly's request. 39 The Court first stated
relying on Art. 65 (1) of the Statute and Art. 96 (2) of the Charter, that three
conditions had to be observed before it could have jurisdiction in an advisory
reference by a specialised agency. like the WHO:
1.

The agency requesting the opinion had to be duly authorised under the Charter.

2.

The opinion sought had to be on a legal question.

3.

The question referred had to be within the scope of the activities
agency.40

of the

Applying the first postulate to the case on hand, it found that the reference
made-by the WHO was valid.41
The Court then referred to the other objections that had been urged by some
nations before it to the effect that the Court should decline to hear the request. The
first objection in this regard was that the question was not a legal one. The Court
dismissed this objection by relying on its rather ambivalent unhappily worded test
in the Western Sahara Case42, that a legal question was one which was "framed in

38 Weiss, supra n. 22 . In the International Court of Justice, no single Judge writes the majority verdict
known as the judgment of the Court. Two judges are selected as a drafting team and they prepare
a draft which is velled comprehensively by the rest of the Court in a joint sitting, Thus if major
differences crop up, the verdict takes longer to prepare, see, N. Singh, The Role And Record Of

The International Court Of Justice (1989).
39 See supra n. 5.
40 Opinion on WHO Request at para. 10.
41 In this connection
tion").

the Court relied on Art. 76 of the Constitution

of the WHO ("WHO Constitu-

It reads:

Uppn authorisation by the General Assembly of the United Nations or upon
authorisation in accordance with any agreement between the Organization
and the United Nations, the Organization may request the International Court
pf Justice for an advisory opinion on any legal question arising within the
competence of the Organization.
Further the Court also relied on the Agreement between the WHO and the General Assembly, supra
n. 31.
42 1975 ICJ 12 at 18
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tenns of law and rais[ing] problems of international law ... (which) are by their very
nature susceptible of a reply based on law ... [and] appear ... to be questions of
a legal character" . It also dismissed objections that the question to the effect that
the question referred to it had political elements. It stating that was the case" with
so many questions which may arise in international law", and therefore it does not
suffice to deprive the question of its legal character The Court also relied on the
jurisprudence that it had fonnulated in its previous response to a WHO query:43
Indeed, in situations in which political considerations are prominent it may be
particularly necessary for an international organisation to obtain an advisory
opinion from the Court as to the legal principles applicable with respect to the
matter under debate, especially when these may include the interpretation of
its Constitution.
The Court then proceeded to observe, and rightly so, that it would discount any
political motives behind the request for they were not material to the establishment
of its jurisdiction to entertain the case.44
Next, the Court examined whether the question posed arose within the scope
of activities of the WHO. For this purpose the Court stated that an examination of
the WHO Con~titution was necessary. It then proceeded to spell out the rules. that
it would utilise to interpret the Constitution which was in the character of a
multilateral treaty. It was of the opinion that objectives of the organisation as
assigned to it by its founders, and its subsequent practise were relevant elements in
interpreting a multilatenll treaty.45 For this proposition the Court relied on Art. 31
(3) (b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.46

. The Lack of Competence in WHO to ask the question
Having set forth the legal framework by which to interpret the WHO Constitution, the Court embarked upon an examination of the Constitution itself. The Court
came to the myopic conclusion that none of the functions that were attributed the
WHO in Art. 2 of its constitution referred expressly to the legality of a situation upon
which it must act. These functions were discharged in order to achieve the objective
of the organisation that of attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of
healthY The Court then drew a fine line of distinction between these provisions
43 See supra n. 32
44 See also, text accompanying

nn. 87·96.

45 Opinion on WHO request at para. 18-19.
46 Vienna Convention

On The Law Of Treaties. ("Vienna Convention")

1155 V.Notet.S.

331: 8 ILM

679 (1969). Art.31 (3). reads:
There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(b)

any subsequent

practise in the application

the parties regarding its interpretation,
47

Constitution

of the WHO, Art. 1.

of the treaty which establishes

the agreement

of
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which it stated invested the WHO with the capacity to take preventive measures and
to deal with the effects of the nuclear weapons and the question that the WHO had
posed to it of the legality of the weapons themselves. The Court ruled that whatever
the effects of the use of nuclear weapons might be, the competence of the WHO to
deal with them was not dependent on the legality of the acts that caused them.48 This
statement is bound to go down in the history of the Court as a highly technical and
myopic interpretation of international law , that is bound to attract as much flak as
the Court attracted following its 1966 decision in the South West Africa Cases Phase
II,49 in which it denied the Liberia and Ethiopia, the standing to question apartheid
in Namibia, despite the fact that a majority of its Justices, had ruled that the case
was admissible in 1962.50 In the case under review, the ICJ further found that none
of the functions of the WHO that were referred to in the resolution of the WHA
containing the query, conferred competence on the organisation to make a request
of the type that it did in the resolution. The Court then proceeded to state that though
the causes of the deterioration of human health were numerous and varied the legal
or illegal character of these causes was essentially immaterial to the measures that
the WHO ought to take in an attempt to remedy these effects.51
Judge Weeramantry, in his sharp dissent, stated that the WHO was the only
international health authority to which the world could turn to in case a country was
smitten by a nuclear attack, for its own health services would have surely collap~ed.52 The WHO was therefore entitled to be legitimately concerned about the
legality of the use of the weapons in the first place. According to him, the query of
the WHO was related to three types of obligations; (i) State obligations in regard
to health; (ii) State obligations in regard to the environment and (Hi) State obligations under the WHO Constitution. This therefore differentiated it from the question
put to the Court by the General Assembly. He found fault with the Court not
directing its inquiry in the direction of these three areas and stated that if it had done
so it would have come to the conclusion that each was linked 'intimately' to the
legitimate concern of the WHO and that in each case state obligations were violated
by nuclear weapons. As explained by Judge Shahabuddeen's dissent, a more

48 Opinion on the WHO request at para. 21.
49 South West Africa Cases (Second Phase), 1966 ICJ 6. It was another instance
President's

in which the

casting vote was the decisive vote in a divided Court.

50 South West Africa Cases (Prelimir.ary Objections) 1962 ICJ 319. Significantly the majority became
the minority in 1966 with a change in the composition of the Court. Nonetheless in 1971, the Court
virtually made "amends' for its 1962 ruling by declaring that South Africa was in violation of
international Jaw on several counts including the extension of apartheid to Namibia, which it had
also been illegally after its mandate over Namibia had been terminated, see, Legal Consequences
for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), 1971 ICJ
28.See generally, 1. Dugard, The South West Africa! Namibia Dispute (1973).

51 See, Opinion on WHO Request at para. 22.
52 Ibid. (dissenting

opinion of Judge Weeramantry).

53 Ibid. (dissenting

opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
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reasonable interpretation of the question that the WHO asked was whether the use
of nuclear weapons would be in breach of a member's obligations under the
Constitution of the WHO.53 Similarly Judge Koroma in his forceful dissent stated
that the reference for an advisory opinion by the WHO related to an issue which was
not only of direct relevance to the Organisation but had practical and contemporary
effect as well, and was not devoid of object and purpose.54
It is submitted that the Court's divesting the WHO of the competence to ask
for a declaration of the legality of the most potentially destructive weapon and the
greatest cancer-inducing instrumentality yet devised,55 is highly regrettable. What
use are the planning and procedure to tackle a nuclear fallout that the Court
recognised to be a task of the WHO, if the organisation is in doubt about the legality
of the very use of the weapon. The fallout from the use of the weapons, is not a akin
to a natural disaster like a famine or flood that the WHO cannot prevent. It is capable
of being avoided especially if there attaches to the action of a state that causes such
a tragedy the label of a violator of international law. According to Judge Koroma,
the staggering consequences of a nuclear attack could not be ignored for they caused
superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering to their victims which gave rise to a
question about their legality.56 Of course the WHO may not have the capability to
take action against such a violator, but at least it will be able to spread awareness
that the action was in contravention of international law. The leI's view that the
WHO must only play the role of a good Samaritan, without being concerned whether
its actions are being necessitated on account of an illegality which may be perpetrated again seems to be quite archaic. Besides the WHO has obligations to protect
the environment57 which is likely to be devastated by any nuclear attack and
therefore if it is not made aware for sure that about the illegality of the cause of the
attack it could hamper its own response and indeed those of its members on whom
any organisation is dependent.

The Principle of Speciality and International Institutions
The Court also made certain other observations with respect to the general
competence of international organisations. It opined that these institutions unlike
states did not possess any general competence and that they were governed by the
principle of speciality which meant that they were conferred by states which created
them with certain powers that naturally came with certain limits. It also recognised
that these powers need not be expressly conferred and can be implied prompted by

54 Ibid. (dissenting
55 Ibid.

(dissenting

opinion of Judge Koroma).
opinion of Judge Weeramantry).

56 Ibid. (dissenting

opinion of Judge Koroma). In this regard, the Judge relied on the evidence that
was produced by the delegations of the Japan and the Marshall islands were the impact of nuclear
explosions were felt.

57 See, G.Palmer, New Ways to make IlIternatiollal
(1992).

ElIvirOllmelltal Law, 86 Am. J. Int'\. L. 259 at 260
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the necessities of international life. But this was not enough according to the Court,
to secure capacity for the WHO to ask the question that it did of the Court. It stated
that to ascribe to the WHO the competence to address the legality of the use of the
weapons would be "tantamount to disregarding the principle of speciality" that it had
just exalted.58 Not even the 'wide international responsibilities' that were conferred
on the WHO by Art. 57 of the Charter was sufficient to enable it to ask the Court
a question about the legal status of the cause of what could be the WHO's potentially
most demanding emergency, that would inevitably follow a nuclear explosion.59
The Court was also unimpressed about the practise of the WHO whereby there could
be an agreement among the members of the Organisation to interpret its Constitution
and thereby empowering it to address the question of the legality of the use of nuclear
weapons.60 tn this regard too, the Weeramantry dissent, found fault with the juristic
method adopted by the Court. According to Judge Weeramantry, the Court had relied
on restricted principles of treaty interpretation and should rather have interpreted the
WHO's Constitution in the light of its objects and purpose, which was to promote
and protect the health of all peoples.61 Judge Koroma on the other hand after
applying the standard of practise of the organisation, as. applied by the Court could
not but be convinced to the contrary of what the Court had concluded in this aspect.
He cited numerous examples, which established the WHO's credentials to seek a
determination the question of the validity of nuclear weapons.62 It is submitted that
the Court should have adopted a teleological approach while interpreting the WHO
Constitution. It has been the settled jurisprudence of the ICJ that it will interpret a
text in a dynamic manner that will embellish legal obligations and terms appropriately in accordance with the changing times. In the Legal Consequences Case, the
ICJ stated:
"the Court must take into consideration the changes which have occurred in
the supervening half century and its interpretation cannot remain unaffected by
the development of law through the Charter of the U.N. and by way of
customary law"63
This was unfortunately ignored and a hypertechnical approach was instead
adopted to deny the WHO from espousing a genuine cause.64

58 See, Opinion on the WHO request, at para. 25.
59 See, ibid. at para. 26.
60 See, ibid. at para. 27.
61 Ibid. (dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry).
62 Ibid. (dissenting opinion of Judge Koroma).
63 See, supra n. 50. See also, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, (Greece v. Turkey), 1978 ICJ 3.
(the meaning of legal terms must be intended to follow the evolution of law through time)
64 In a previous decision, the ICJ overcame several technical and procedural irregularities in the
request made to it for advice and yet declined to return the question unanswered, see, Application
for Review of Judgment No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1973 ICJ 183.
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In its conclusion the Court ruled after considering some other arguments
relating to the manner in wbicb the WHA resolution bad been adopted that these
would not change the conclusion that the Court had reached that since an essential
condition to found its jurisdiction was absent it could not give the opinion that had
been requested.65
C. THE VERDICT

ON THE GENERAL

ASSEMBLY

QUERY

On the same day that the World Court declined to answer the WHO query, it
pronounced on the related question that the General Assembly had posed.66 The
response that the Court gave to the General Assembly was divided into seven parts
and varying number of votes were recorded in relation to each part ranging from
unanimity to deep divisiori. The conclusions of the Court in this regard are set out
below:
1.

The request for the advisory opinion by the Court was in order and the Court
would comply with it.67

2.

There is neither in customary nor conventional international law any specific
authorisation of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.68

3.

There is neither in customary nor conventional intemationallaw any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the. threat or use of force of nuclear
weapons.69

4.

A threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons that is contrary to Art.
the United Nations Charter and that failed to meet all the requirements
of An. 51 is unlawfut.7°
:2 (41 ,)f

65

Upllll<'fl

"1l,IHO Request at para. 29 & 30.

66 Opmioll

Ot! General Assembly Request. According to Judge Koroma's
dissent in the Opinion on
the WHO re'luest, the Court in the latter. case had wrongly treated the question that the WHO had
posed on a similar plane to that asked by the General Assembly. He believed that the two were
differeni. Th¢ WHO's question was more specific which resulted in the Court's
competence to
answer tile '1,,-eslion, something that it denied to itself. The query wanted to know the specific
obligations of member states in view of the health and environmental effects with respect to the
use of nuclear weapons. It was not a broad and general query like the General Assembly's that
merited an inquiry for instance the law connected with the threat or use of force under the Charter.
It was far more focused and had a close nexus to the WHO Constitution and practise, see Opinion
on the WHO Request, (dissenting opinion of Judge Koroma). For a view that the two questions were
identical, but arriving at the conclusion that nuclear weapons are not prohibited in international
law, see, Rostow, supra n. 6 at 152, n. 3.

67 Opinion on the General Assembly Request at para. 105. All the Justices with the exception of Judge
Oda voted in favour of ruling in this manner.
68 [d., Unanimous

decision on this point.

69 [d. All the Justices except Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry and Koroma agreed to this proposition.
70 [d. Unanimous

conclusion

of the World Court.
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5.

A threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the
requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly
those principles and rules of international humanitarian law, as well as with
specific obligations under treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal
with nuclear weapons.71

6.

It followed from the above mentioned requirements that the threat or use of
nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law
applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of
humanitarian law. However in view of the current state of international law,
and the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court could not conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be unlawful in an
extreme circumstance of self defence, in which the very survival of a State
would be at stake.72

7.

There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and
effective international control.73
Each of these pronouncements

will be separately analysed below.

D. COMPETENCE OF THE Ie] TO ENTERTAIN
REQUEST OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

AND ANSWER

THE

The Opinion on the General Assembly Request has some dicta with respect to
the important issue on the nature of the advisory opinion. Some states had objected
to the ICl's answering the question posed to it on the ground that the Security
Council and the General Assembly could not ask for an opinion by the Court on
matters that were totally unrelated to their work. This objection was dismissed by
the Court and rightly so on two grounds. First, the competence of the General
Assembly to seize the Court was very wide in light of Art. 10 of the Charter that
empowered the General Assembly to put questions to the IC] with respect to any
mattet within the scope of the Charter.74 Second, the matter that had been sent to
the Court for its opinion was one in respect of which the General Assembly had had

71 Id.

72 Id. A deeply divided verdict resolved with the casting vote of the President.
73 Id., Voting without dissent on this point.
74 The Court also referred to Arts. 11 of the Charter that give the General Assembly the competence
to consider general principles of international law in the maintenance of international peace and
security including principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments. Art 13 that
enabled it initiate studies in international law and its codification was also cited in this context by
the Court, see, Ibid. at para. 11.
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a "long-standing interest", which had been manifest by the its various deliberations
and other activities.75
Pari Passu Exercise of Jurisdictio!l
After this ruling, the judgment of the Court contains a line that is rather
unusual, for on a plain reading no ready connection with the earlier discussion is
made by the Court. It states" In this context, it does not matter that important recent
and current activities relating to nuclear disarmament are being pursued in other
fora." (emphasis mine). What the Court means by this appears to be unclear. Reading
between the lines however, one gets the impression that this was sentence was added
in relation to an argument similar to one raised in the many cases earlier. It concerns
an objection that when a matter is before other non-judicial international bodies, the
ICI must refrain from pari passu exercise of jurisdiction over it. Whether such a
contention was actually made in the instant case is not apparent from the judgment
for it does not refer to any such submission nor does it say that its remark was in
response such an argument. However, the fact is that the point has been dealt with
in the judgment, and therefore merits some analysis. In the past, various states have
submitted in matters that have been brought against them that the ICI should refrain
from deciding, for other political organs of the United Nations, like the Security
Council where deliberating over the same. Further, they have contended that any
order issued by the Court would be interfering with the domain of the other organ.
These arguments have been invariably rejected by the Court. In the Hostages Case,
it stated in response to such a submission:
"[I]t does seem to have occurred to any member of the Council that there was
or could be anything irregular in the simultaneous exercise of their respective
functions by the Court and the Security Council. The reasons are clear. It is
for the Court, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, to resolve any
legal questions that may be in issue between the parties to a dispute; and the
resolution of such legal questions by the Court may be an important, and
sometimes decisive, factor in promoting the peaceful settlement of the dispute."76
Similar rulings were made by the Court in the Aegean Sea Continental,77

75 In arriving at this conclusion the Court relied on the various debates in the First Committee, the
General Assembly resolutions, the three special sessions of the body on disarmament, the annual
meetings of the Disarmament Commission and the commissioning of studies on the effects of
nuclear weapons, see, ibid. at para. 12.

76 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran Case (United States v. Iran), 1980 ICJ 3.
77 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), (Interim Protection),

1976 ICJ 3.
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Nicarag ua, 78 Lockerbie Cases.79 They clearly enunciate the principle that the
deliberations in another organ on a certain matter will not preclude the ICJ from
hearing and deciding a legal dispute or giving legal advise on it. 80 It would seem
that in the case at hand this proposition was reiterated for objections could perhaps
have been raised to the effect that the Court should refrain from deciding the case
due to the ongoing negotiations on the renewal of the NPT and the CTBT.81
However the judgment gives no hint of this fact being in its contemplation when it
added the sentence described above.

Legal Question
The Court then went on to satisfy itself that the question with which it was
concerned with was indeed a legal one for it to render advise.82 In this regard it made
reference to the vague formulation in the Western Sahara Case on what a legal
question was.83 It used this test to rule that the question put to it by the general
assembly was legal for it had to use international law as the reference point to decide
on the validity of nuclear weapons. In this context it defined its task as being the
identification of the existing principles and rules, their interpretation and application
to the issue of nuclear weapons. It then referred to an earlier judgment on an
administrative matter relating to the UN to rule that the fact that the question
concerned had political aspects would not suffice to deprive it of its character as a
legal question and to divest the Court of a competence expressly conferred on its
Statute.84 It then made reference to a whole host of other decisions made in advisory
capacity where it had been urged not to entertain the matter but had nonetheless gone
ahead and decided it. 85

The Political Qz:estion Doctrine
The judgment stated significantly that the political nature of the motives which
may be said to have inspired the request and the political implications that the
78 See, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States),
1986 ICJ 3
79 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.; Libya v. U.S.), (Provisional Measures), 1992 ICJ 3.see
also, D.Ciobanu, Litispendence between the International Court of Justice and the Political
Organs of the United Nations in Leo Gross (Ed.) 1 Future Of The International Court Of Justice
209 (1976).
80 See generally, Schwebel, Justice In International Law (1994); S. Rosenne, 2 The Law And Practise
Of The International Court Of Justice (1965).
81 Rostow, supra n. 6.
82 Opinion on General Assembly Request at para. 13.
83 See, text accompanying n. 42.
84 Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal,
(Advisory Opinion), 1973 ICJ 172 at para. 14 cited in Opinion on General Assembly Request at
para. 13 .
85 Opinion on General Assembly Request at para. 14.
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opinion given have were of no relevance in the establishment of its jurisdiction to
give such an opinion.86 This ruling was in response to the vociferous contentions
of some states and indeed some juristic writing that the Court would be travelling
into the political thicket which it had no warrant to enter by considering the matter. 87
It is submitted that the Court was right when it threw out such an argument firmly.
The doctrine of a political question has been the invention of the American Courts,
in order not to overstep their limits when it came to deciding matters that had more
political than legal overtones.88 the ICI has never adopted it as its jurisprudence
and indeed should not for it provides nations with a convenient ground to escape
international judicial scrutiny.89 The practise of the ICI beginning with the Corfu
Channel Case,90 has involved cases with widespread political implications that
concerned vital state interests and, at times, explosive issues - if not outright
hostilities.91 Every matter in international law is bound to raise some political issues,
international law is not oblivious to it,92 The Court administers the Law of Nations
cannot be insulated from the many political dimensions that it will invariably
entai1.93 As Shabtai Rosenne points out by virtue of its position as the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations, the Court must operate for the maintenance of
international peace and security.94 Indeed the complexities of international law
necessitate a wide construction of the nature of issues over which the ICI can

86 But see, Ibid. (dissenting opinion of Judge Oda). Oda took an extreme posture by which he found
that the request made by the General Assembly was prepared and drafted - not in order to ascertain
the status of existing international law in the subject but to try to promote the total elimination of
nuclear weapons, which he opined smacked of political motives. Accordingly he voted to reject
the request at the threshold as judicial propriety demanded that the Court refrain from dealing with
the matter.
87 Rostow, supra n. 6 at 162, n. 65. See also, O.Schachter, Disputes Involving the Use of Force in
L. F. Damrosch (Ed.) The International Court Of Justice At A Crossroads 238 (1987).
88 See, L.Henkin, Is there a Political Question Doctrine, 85 Yale LJ. 597 at 607-17 (1976); L.H.
Tribe, American Constitutional Law 96 - 97 (1988): T.M. Franck, Political Questions And Judicial

Answers (1992)
89 Only the ICJ' s predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice ("PCIJ") has declined
to hear a matter on the grounds that the interplay of the economic interests that were involved posed
questions outside the sphere in which a Court of Justice could help in the solution of disputes
between the states concerned, see, Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, 1932 PCIJ
(ser. AIB) No. 46 at 162.

90 Corfu Channel (UK. v. Albania) (Preliminary

Objections),

1948 ICJ 15.

The Relationship Between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council
in the light of the Lockerbie Case, 88 Am. 1. Int'I. L. 643 (1994).

91 V.Debbas,

92 Raghavan,

supra n. 6.

93 See, H.Mosler, Political and Justiciable Legal Disputes: Revival of an Old Controversy in B.
Cheng & E. Brown (Eds.) Contemporary Problems Of International Law: Essays In Honour Of
Georg Schwal7.enberger 216 (1988).
94 See, supra n. 80 at 23. In relation to preliminary objections made by states under Art. 36 (2) stating
that the dispute is nORjusticiable

being 'non - legal' issues, see, E,Gorden,

Legal Disputes

under

Article 36 (2) of the Statute in [be International Court Of Justice At The Crossroads, supra n. 6
at 183.
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deliberate, to include as it did in the instant case, assessment of political, humanitarian, social and moral considerations as part of the legal process, if it is truly to
be a Wodd Court.95

Jurisprudence on an Advisory Opinion
The next part that the Court's judgment dealt with was as respects the nature
of the advisory jurisdiction that had been invoked. This became necessary for certain
states had submitted vehemently that the ICI decline to give advise. Broadly five
main reasons were advanced in this regard.96 First, there was no specific dispute
before the Court. Second, the abstract nature of the question posed to the Court might
lead it to make a hypothetical or speculative declaration outside the scope of its
judicial function. Third, the General Assembly had not explained to the Court its
precise purpose in seeking the request. Four, an opinion from the Court would
adversely affect disarmament negotiations; and five, the Court would be going
beyond its judicial role and would be taking upon itself, a law making capacity.
The Court refused to take heed of all these objections for it considered that it
had the authority to answer the question posed and there were no compelling reasons
for it not to do so.97 It then referred to the past precedents and distinguished the two
instances in respect of which an answer was not provided.98 It further ruled drawing
on its previous jurisprudence that it could give an advisory opinion on any legal

95 See, R.Higgins, Policy Considerations and International Judicial Process, 17 Infl. & Compo L.
Q. 58 at 61 (19(,8).
96 See, Opinion on General Assembly Request at para. 15.
97 In so ruling the Court referred to a part of the judgment in the Peace Treaties Case without citing
the lines that preceded it. These lines state in clear terms the value that the Court must attach when
considering state objections to the grant of an advisory opinion. The portion of the ruling not stated
in the judgment under review has been ernphasised to distinguish it from that part that it had quoted:

The consent of States parties to a dispute is the basis of the Court's jurisdiction in contentious
cases. The situation is different in regard to advisory proceedings even where the Request for an
opinion relates to a legal question actually pending between states. The Court's reply is only of
an advisory character and as such it has no binding force. It follows that no State, whether a
member of the United Nations or not, can prevent the giving of an Advisory Opinion which the
United Nations consider to be desirable in order to obtain enlightenment as to the course of action
it should take. The Court's opinion is given not to the States but to the organ which is entitled to
request it; the reply of the Court itself an 'organ of the United Nations' represents
in the activities of the Organisation and, in principle, should not be refused.

its participation

Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, (Advisory
Opinion), 1950 ICI 65 at 71; See also, KJ. Keith, The Extent Of The Advisory Opinion Of The
International Court Of Justice (1971).
98 In the Eastern Carelia Case, the PCIJ, refused to give answer a question out to it on the ground
that since the matter referred was a dispute to which one of the parties that was not a member of
the League of Nations or to the Statute of the pcn objected. See, Status of Eastern Carelia, 1923
PCIJ (ser.B) No.5. The other case where the World Court did not respond by answering the query
was the opinion on the request made by the World Health Organisation.
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question, abstract, or otherwise that was posed to it.99 The judgment also did not
consider it necessary for the General Assembly to have disclosed to it the reasons
for it having sought the advisory opinion.loo The Court also categorically rejected
the contention that its reply was' likely to affect disannament negotiations and
therefore would be contrary to the interest of the United Nations. Rather it felt that
its conclusions would have relevance for a debate on the negotiations on the
matter.lol It also refuted the contention that it would by rendering the opinion take
upon itself the task of legislation for that would depend upon a supposition that the
"present corpus juris (is) devoid of relevant rules in this matter ."102 It is submitted
that the widely couched ruling of the Court dismissing objections to it answering the
case, will serve as a pace setter for future judicial resolution of international disputes
that are not amenable to settlement through the contentious clauses.l03 A reference
can be made by the General Assembly or any other plenary body and the Court will
answer the question as it would have done if the parties had in fact referred the matter
to it through Art. 36 (1) or (2) of the Statute. Further, since the ICJ has nothing akin
to the powers of judicial review over the resolutions of the General Assembly,104 it
will invariably decide the dispute when it is sent to the Hague with the imprimatur
of the General Assembly, which the Court will not in principle refuse.l05 The ruling
is important for it reverses the earlier trend of the ICJ by which it had moved away
from being a participant in a process for the peaceful settlement of interstate disputes
towards becoming a constitutional court advising requesting organs of international

99

Opinion on General Assembly Request citing Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership
in the United Nations (Article 4 if the Charter) (Advisory
Consequences Case, supra n. 50.

Opinion),

1948 ICJ 57 at 61; Legal

100 Ibid. at para. 16.
101 Ibid. at para. 17.
102 Ibid. at para. 18.
103 The leeway that the Court has rendered to the General Assembly or for that matter any competent
organ is tremendous, judging from the words that it chose for its observations in this regard. It
stated, "once the general assembly has asked, by adopting a resolution, for an advisory opinion
on a legal question, the Court in determining whether there any compelling reasons for it to refuse
to give such an opinion, will not have regard to the origins or to the political history of the request,
or to the distribution of votes in respect of the adopted resolution"., Id. at para. 16. But cf.
Schwebel, Was the Capacity to Request an Advisory Opinion Wider in the Permanent Court of
International Justice That It is in the International Court of Justice ?, 62 Brit. Y. B. Int'l. L. 77
(1992).

104 See, Legal Consequences Case, supra n. 50 . see also, V.S. Mani, The Role of Law and Legal
Considerations in the Functioning of the United Nations (manuscript on file with the author) .
In relation to the absence of the powers of judicial review in the ICJ, see generally, G.R. Watson,
Constitutionalism, Judicial Review and the World Court, 34 Harv. Int'1. L. 1. 1 at 8 (1993); But
see, Thomas M. Franck, "The Powers of Appreciation", Who is the Ultimate Guardian of UN
Legality, 86 Am. J. Int'1. L. 519 (1992);, H.E. Alvarez, Judging the Security Council, 90 Am.
J. Int'1. L. 1 (1996); W.M.Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87 Am. J.
Int'\. L. 83 (1993-).

105 See, Reservations to the Genocide Convention, 1951 ICJ 15. However in the case under review,
Judge Oda stressed the need for judicial economy in rendering advisory opinions, supra n. 86.
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matters which directly affect them. 106 From now on the advisory jurisdiction can be
invoked more widely by the General Assembly though it is not possible to say that
the same will apply to the other specialised agencies as well.107

E. THE FORMULATION OF THE QUESTION AND APPliCABLE

LAW

The Court refused to be drawn into a debate as to the divergence between the
English and French texts to water down the import of the question. It ruled that the
real object of the question was to determine the legality or illegality of the threat or
use of nuclear weapons,l°8

The Lotus Doctrine
Another suggestion was made by some states that the question deserved to be
reformulated by the Court for it went against a classical prescription of international
law in the Lotus Case, that states were bound only by rules or prohibitions in
international law that they created through relinquishing their sovereignty, there
could be no sui generis rule of international law .109 This arose on account of the
fact that the question was phrased in such a manner as to whether international law
permitted the weapons, which it was argued should be instead replaced by the
expression, prohibited, for that would adhere to the Lotus doctrine of letting the
states' consent be the deciding factor in what ought to be internationallaw,u°
States
would be free to threaten or use nuclear weapons unless it was otherwise prohibited.
The Court did not find favour with such a suggestion for it found that the states
that possessed nuclear weapons had not disputed that their independence to act was
based on precepts of international law (emphasis mine). It is submitted that the
Court reached the right result albeit with strained reasoning. By stating that the
nuclear weapon States agreed to be governed by humanitarian norms in their

106 See, C. Gray, Judicial Remedies In International Law 116 (1990), Gray contrasts the fact that
seventeen of the twenty seven advisory opinions rendered by the PCD were in relation to disputes
between states compared to three out of the eleven of the ICJ. In some cases of advisory opinions,
the ICJ itself was at pains to suggest that it was not ruling on a dispute between two parties like
in contentious proceedings, see, Legal Consequences Case, supra n. 50. Even the Statute and the
rules of the Court recognise the possibility that a potentially contentious case can be decide under
the grab of an advisory opinion, see, Statute, Art. 68 (In the exercise of its advisory functions
the Court shall further be guided by the provisions of the present Statute which shall apply in
contentious cases to the e)(tent to which it recognises them to be applicable), see also, Rules Of
The International Court Of Justice, Art. 89 (an appointment of a judge ad hoc may be allowed
if there is a legal question actually pending between the parties). See generally, M. Pomerance,

The Advisory Jurisdiction Of The International Court In The League And The UN Eras (1973).
107 See, text accompanying

n. 58.

108 Opinion on General Assembly Request.
109 The Lotus, (France v. Turkey), 1927 PCIJ (ser. A), No. 10. See also, R. Jennings and A. Watts
(Eds.) 1 Oppenheim's International Low 4 9th ed. (1992); H.Kelson, The Law Of The United
Nations 50 (1966).
110 See, Rostow, supra n. 6 at 164 - 165.

50

National Law School Journal

[1997

independence to act, the Court did not squarely counter and reject the Lotus
submission described above. It could still be pointed out that even humanitarian
norms are created by the consent of states, and therefore specific prohibitions were
required on nuclear weapons. III International law had progressed greatly since the
invention of the Lotus doctrine, when only states were the subject of international
law. New subjects that arc distinct from any states are contributing to the formulation
of new norms of international law. A ready example is the gathering corpus of the
law of international and regional institutions, which is replete with indicators that
point to the illegality of nuclear weapons.t12 Moreover, the growing importance
attached to non-governmental organisations, (NGOs) in the formation of intern ationallaw cannot be ignoredllJ, they have overwhelmingly spoken out against the
horrors of nuclear weapons, and indeed the World Court project that started the
process by which opinions from the Court were sought functions as an NGO of
sorts.114 Falk commenting on the invocation of the Lotus doctrine to defend the
validity of nuclear weapons, stated that it would seem ludicrous to extend a principle
that was developed to assess a very narrow question of jurisprudential competence
in a criminal negligence controversy arising out of a collision on the high seas, to
the drastically different circumstances surrounding the consideration of the legal
status of nuclear weapons. 115

Choosing The Applicable lAw
The next task of the Court was to choose the law that it would apply in
answering the question. In this regard, it referred to the various branches of
international law that had been referred by nations as applicable reference points to
gauge the validity of nuclear weapons. They consisted of the following:
1.

III

The right to Life guaranteed by the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights ("ICCPR"): The Court was not very impressed with the ability

See. Meron. supra n. 28.

112 See, D. Khosla, Nuclear Test Cases: Judicial Valour v. Judicial Discretion, 18 Ind. J. In1'l. L.
322 (1978).
113 See. D.Shelton,

The Participation of Non Governmental Organisations in International Judicial
Proceedings, 88 Am. J. Int'l. L. 611 (1994). See also, PJ. Spiro, New Global Communities in
International Decision- Making Institutions, 18 The Wash. Q. 45 (No. I, 1994) (suggesting that
international

deliberating

forum should include representatives

from NGO groups); A.M. Clark,

Non-Governmental Organisations and their influence on International Society, 48 J. Int'1. Aff.
507 (1995) (examining
decision making).

the implications

of granting recognition

to NGO grou[s in international

114 See, Burroughs

and Cabasso, supra n. 6. In the matter involving the WHO's request, the
International
Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War requested the Court to submit
information to it. Though the Registrar of the Court replied stating that the Court had considered
the offer with all the care it deserved, by noting the Physicians association with the WHO, the
Court ultimately decided against accepting any help from the body, Shelton, ibid. at 624.

115 R. Falk (Ed.), Towards a Legal Regime for Nuclear Weapons, in International Law: A Contemporary Perspective 453 at 457 (1985).
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of this precept to guide it in determining the validity of nuclear weapons,
though it would have implications in individual cases of weapon usel16
2.

The Genocide Convention, as a prohibition against the extermination of a
group, which was possible by the use of nuclear weapons; was also not helpful
in the Court's endeavour to make a general ruling.l17

3.

International Environmental Law: Here the Court was ambivalent as to the
actual status of environmental law vis a vis the legality of nuclear weapons.
After referring to several instruments that dealt with the international protection of the environment118, the Court stated that there was a general duty on
all states to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect
the environment of other 8tates or of areas beyond national control.119 It then
went on to rule that that the instruments in question could not be said to deprive
a state of the exercise of its right of self-defence under international law.
Nonetheless, states had to take environmental considerations into account
when assessing what was necessary and proportionate to meet their legitimate
military objectives.120 The Court also ruled significantly in relation to the law
governing warfare, that the respect shown to the environment was one of the
elements that would go to assess whether an action was necessary and
proportionate in meeting military objectives.121 However the Court came to
the conclusion that international environmental law did not contain any
prohibitions on the use of nuclear weapons.l22

After this survey of applicable law, the Court came to the conclusion ~t the
"most directly relevant applicable law governing the question of which it was seized,
(is) that relating to the use of force enshrined in the United Nations Charter and the

116 Opinion on General Assembly Request at para. 24.
117 Ibid. at para. 25 - 26.
118 The Additional

Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions

609; Convention

on the Prohibition

of 1949, Art. 35 (3), 1125 UNTS

of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental

Modification Techniques, lI08 UNTS 151; The Stockholm
The Rio Declaration, 31 ILM 74 (1992).

Declaration,

11 ILM 1416 (1972),

119 Opinion on General Assembly Request. at para. 29. In doing so the Court has adopted a
modification of the principle enunciated in the Stockholm Declaration, that extended the Trail
Smelter principle by which states are to use their territory to cause harm to others, See, L.B. Sohn,
The Stockholm Declaration on the Environment, 14 Harv. In!'!. L. J. 423 at 485 (1973).
120 Ibid. at para. 30.
121

In this connection

the Court referred to a General Assembly Resolution

on the Protection

of the

Environment during Armed Conflict, see, G.A Res. 37, U.N. GAOR 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. AI
37/47. (Nov. 25, 1992). See also, New Zealand Request, supra n. 19 at para. 64.
122 Judges Weeramantry and Koroma appended dissents on this point, for they considered that the
corpus of international environmental law did outlaw nuclear weapons, see, Opinion on General
Assembly Request (dissenting opinions of Judges Weeramantry and Koroma).
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law applicable in anned conflict wbicb regulates the conduct of bostilities, together
with any specific treaties that the Court migbt determine to be relevant ".123
However before it commenced the exercise of applying the law and answering
the question asked of it, the Court undertook the unusual exercise of bigbligbting
the "unique cbaracteristics of nuclear weapons".124 According to the Court, nuclear
weapons were "explosive devices wbose energy resulted from the fusion or fission
of the atom". As a consequence, large amounts of beat, energy and radiation were
released. This being so, the destructive power of the weapons could not be contained
in either space or time. They had the potential to destroy all civilization and the entire
eco-system of the planet.

Inter-Generational Equity
In the course of this discussion, the judgment seems to bave recognised a path
breaking concept that is bound to have far reaching effect. Tbis concerns the
principle of intergenerational equity or the rights of future generations to inherit
earth in no worse or perhaps even an improved manner from that being enjoyed by
current generations.125 In recognising that ", ..the use of nuclear weapons would be
a serious danger to future generations", the Court has anointed the intergenerational
equity for legal use by international tribunals especially in relation to conservation
and protection of the environment. 126

F. THE LAW RELATING TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AND
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Use of Force, Self Defense, Proportionality and Nuclear Weapons
The frrst port of call in determining the validity of nuclear weapons for the
Court, was the law contained in Art. 2 (4) of the Charter that proscribes states from
using threats or use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of another State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations. This principle is subject to the exercise of the rigbt to self defence
under Art. 51 and military enforcement by the Security Council under Art. 42. Tbe
Court found that none of these provisions referred to the use of any specific weapon,
including nuclear weapons. But at the same time a weapon that was unlawful could
not be legally used in a legitimate use of force allowed under Arts. 42 or 51.127 The

123 Ibid. at para. 34.
124 Ibid. at para. 35.
125 See. E.B. Weiss, In Fairness To Future Generations To Future Generations (1989); G.P.
Supanich, The Legal Basis of Intergenerational Equity, I Y.B. Int'l. Env. L. 94 (1993).
126 In relation to the use of this principle by national courts, see, V. Raghavan, The Environment,
Future Generations and Intergenerational Equity: Our Duties to our Posterity, (on file with the
author).
127 Opinion on General Assembly Request at para. 39.
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Court then recalled its pronouncement in Nicaragua, where it had stated that the
exercise of the right of self-defence had to be tempered by the conditions of
proportionality and necessity, which were dictates of customary international law Y8
At this stage the Court displayed the vacillation that it was suffering in answering
the question and hinted at what was yet to come with respect to its refusal to lay down
law decisively. It stated that the proportionality principle could not by itself exclude
the use of nuclear weapons in self-defence in all circumstances, but at the same time
a use of force that was proportionate had to satisfy the law of armed conflict and
humanitarian norms in order to be legal. This curious logic is regrettable, for looked
at in light of the Court's earlier narration of the devastating potential of nuclear
weapons, there is no warrant for suggesting that their use can ever be described as
a proportionate response, even to the use of other nuclear weapons.129
Furthermore, the Court brushed aside arguments by some states who had
contended that the risk factor in using nuclear weapons was so great that it negated
the possibility of proportionality being complied with.130 It preferred to rather
callously state that these risks would have to be "further considerations" to be borne
in mind by States who wished to exercise the nuclear option in self-defence. It then
stated that the Security Council had adopted in 1995 a resolution that took note of
certain security assurances made by States parties to the NPT against the use of
nuclear weapons and assuring immediate assistance to a non-nuclear weapons state
which was a party to the NPT and was the victim of a threat or attack from nuclear
weapons. In regard to these 'assurances', Chimni points outthat they were not meant
to be legally valid, which makes the Court's reliance on them suspect.l3l

The Legality of Nuclear Reprisals
On the question of reprisals, the Court did not express its opinion on those
conducted during peace, as they were unlawful, anyway. But with respect to
belligerent reprisals it preferred to state rather ambiguously that it would also be
governed by the principle of proportionality.132 Brownlie has stated in this connection that it would not be correct to extend the doctrine of reprisals essentially

128 Supra n. 78.
129 Weston, supra n. 22, Rostow, supra n. 6 at 171, n. 124; M.Feinrider, International Law as Law
of the Land: Another Constitutional Constraint on Use of Nuclear Weapons in Nuclear Weapons
And International Law 83 supra n. 6 at 96-97.
130 Mter an exhaustive survey of literature and state practise Gardam argues that proportionality has
become a conventional rule after the adoption of the 1977 Protocol to the Geneva Convention
, see, supra n .. She also hints at possibly having entered the realm of custom. It mainly requires
observance of two factors, the avoiding of civilian causalities and refraining from the 'use of
weapons that will cause indiscriminate damage. Nuclear weapons clearly violate both these
principles, see, J.G.Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 Am. J. Int'1. L.
391 (1993).
131 Chimni, supra n. 22 .
132

Opinion on General Assembly

Request at para. 46.
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involved in relation to conventional weapons to nuclear weapons which were equal
to the total war efforts, and therefore did not fit into the current lawp3

The Prohibition on the Threat of force and Nuclear Weapons
The Court then considered the ambit of threat to use force in relation to the
question before it. This concerned the possibility of one state signalling to another
that it had nuclear weapons capability. In ruling on this point, the Court made some
important general statements in relation to the law governing the area. According
to the Court whether such a signal amounted to a threat depended upon various
factors. If the envisaged use of force was itself unlawful, the stated readiness to use
it would be a threat prohibited under Art. 2 (4). It would be illegal for a State to
threaten force to secure territory from another State, or to cause it to follow or not
follow certain political or economic paths. Furthermore, the Court opined that the
notions of "threat" and "use" of force stood together in the sense that if the use of
force itself in a given case was illegal for whatever reason, the threat to use such
force would likewise be illegal.134
But in relating this jurisprudence to the instant case, the Court again suffered
from vagueness. In a half-hearted answer to those nations which had contended that
the very possession of nuclear weapons violated Charter principles on the threat of
force, the Court meekly stated their legality was linked to whether they were directed
against the territorial independence of another state, or were against the purposes of
the United Nations, or if used as a means of self-defence they would violate the
principles of proportionality and necessity. In this connection the Court also referred
to the policy of deterrence which it noted had had to credible in order to dissuade
other states from using nuclear weapons. Hereto the Court was not categoric on
legality or otherwise of this practiseps
Moreover, at this stage, the Court announced its intention not to cover two
important questions relating to the use of force and nuclear weapons. First, the use
of nuclear weapons by the Security Council in an enforcement action under Art. 42.
Second, the threat or use of weapons by a stale within its boundaries. The reason
given by the Court for declining to rule on these aspects was that they had not been
adverted to by states that had appeared in the proceedings.136 It is submitted that the
ruling on this point is wrong and represents one more instance of the Court running
away from facing the question put to it by the General Assembly. This was not a
contentious matter where it is necessary for the Court to have been guided by the
submissions of the parties, nor was it a matter that was the subject of a pending
dispute between parties, that would perhaps, require a ruling essentially on the points

133 Brownlie,

supra n. 9 at 438.

134 Opinion on General Assembly Request at para. 47.
135 Ibid. at para. 48.
136 Ibid. at para. 49

&

50.

Vol. 9]

55

The Legality of Nuclear Weapons Cases

that they raised. The question posed by the General Assembly was clear and all
aspects of it had to be explored, regardless of submissions being made by States.137
What if no state had appeared before the Court and made submissions, would it have
declined ruling on the question entirely?138
G. THE STATUS OF NUCLEAR
VENTIONAL INTERNATIONAL

WEAPONS
LAW

IN CUSTOMARY

AND CON-

In the course of the Opinion on the General Assembly Request. the IC] made
an examination of the realm of treaty and customary conventional international law
in order to determine whether it contained any prohibition on nuclear weapons. At
the outset, the IC] clarified that there was no specific authorisation either in
customary international law or in treaty law for the threat or use of nuclear weapons,
nor was there a necessity that there had to be a specific authorisation for this purpose.
It then made reference to the fact that State practise indicated that illegality of certain
weapons did not result from any absence of authorisation, but was instead premised
on prohibitions.139

Treaty and Conventional Law on Nuclear Weapons
The Court then embarked on a journey to ascertain whether treaty and
convention international law contained a proscription against nuclear weapons. In
this regard it referred to me contention that nuclear weapons had to be treated akin
to poisonous weapons that had been outlawed through numerous international legal
instruments.140 It ruled that though these texts did not define the meaning of the
poisonous weapons that they were meant to banish from warfare, subsequent
practice of states was clear whereby they had not applied these treaties to nuclear
warfare. Here again the reasoning of the Court is backward. How does one gauge
the practice of states in this regard? The answer obviously lies in the instances during
which they occasion has arisen for it to be demonstrated. The fact is that there has
hardly been an occasion for state practice to manifest itself in relation to the treaties
concerned being applicable to nuclear weapons, since only twice instances of use
have taken place. Therefore the fact that existing state practice relates only to
ordinary poisons in warfare is no warrant for denying their application to nuclear

137 Rosenne, supra n. 80 at 740.
138 Judge Winiarski in Peace Treaties Case, stated that though the Court is bound by the questions
put in the request it was not bound by the submissions of the parties, Peace Treaties Case, supra
n. 97 at 91. Rosenne in this regard states that the role of States and international organisations
is confined to that of an amicus curiae., ibid. at 732. It is submitted that an amicus not addressing
an issue does not relieve the Court of answering the query put to it.
139 Opinion on General Assembly Request at para. 52.
140 The Hague Declaration Concerning Asphyxiating Gases of 1899, reprinted in A. Roberts and
R.Guelff (Eds.) Documents On The Law Of War 36 (1989); Hague Convention (IV) Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, reprinted in id. at 52; Protocol for the Prohibition of the
Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gasses, and of Bacteriological Methods of
Warfare, 94 L.N. T. S. 65.
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weapons too, since their effects are as devastating as those caused by conventional
poisons. Moreover, the absence of a limiting definition of the types of substances
that the treaties in question were meant to deal with, it is submitted that a teleological
interpretation could have been preferred to bring nuclear weapons within their
purview. Indeed the opinions of a large number of publicists have been to the effect
that the effects of nuclear use violate the Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925.141 This
convention which was supplemented and improved upon in 1972 to include bacteriological production and toxic weapons.142 Neither this document nor the Chemical
Weapons Convention143 found favour with the Court to help it rule that nuclear
weapons were illegal, for they too did not contain any specific prohibition on nuclear
weapons. This judgment ignores the fact that nuclear, bacteriological and chemical
weapons have the same consequences on humans, plants, animals; they affect a vast
area and have unpredictable and uncontrollable macrobiological effects, such as
increasing the rate of cancer within communities.144 It is difficult to understand the
legal basis and indeed the moral basis for condemning one type of weaponry but
tolerating the other, since the scale and scope of destruction is analogous for all the
three varieties of weaponry.145
The Court also referred to the various efforts on a multilateral and regional
level to usher in a intemationallegal regime relating nuclear weapons. 146According
to the Court, these negotiations, were in relation to (i) the acquisition, manufacture
and possession of nuclear weapons, (ii) the deployment of nuclear weapons and (c)
the testing of nuclear weapons. In particular, it referred to three instruments, the
Tlateloko Treaty,147 The Rarotonga Treaty148 and the NPT extension treaty of
1995149, which according to it directly addressed the question of recourse to nuclear
weapons. After analysing the treaties and the various declarations and reservations
appended to them, the Court summarised the arguments among States for legality

141 See supra n. 139. See also, Singh, supra n. 7 at 162-6; Greenspan, The Modem Law Of Land
Waifare 372 (1959); Schwarzenberger, supra n. 9 at 37 - 38; Falk, Meyrowtiz & Sanderson, supra
n. 22 at 563; Weston, supra n. 22 .
142 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons, 26 U.S.T. 585.
143 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on their Destruction,
144 See, Singh, supra n. 7 at 165; On the devastating medical effects of Nuclear weapons, see, F.
Solomon and R.G. Marston (Eds.) The Medical Effects Of Nuclear War (1986) (a collection of
essays by eminent physicians and scientists).
145 Meyrowitz, supra n. 22.
146 See, treaties, cited Opinion on General Assembly Request at para. 58.
147 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, 634 UNTS 205.
148 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, 24 ILM 1440 (1985).
149 Final Document on the Extension of the Treaty of Non· Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 34
ILM 259 (1995).
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of the weapons and those against it. Then the Court deduced certain propositions that
emerged from the instruments:150

1.

A number of States had undertaken not to use nuclear weapons in specific
zones or against certain other States.

2.

Nevertheless, even within this framework, .the nuclear weapon States had
reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances; and

3.

The reservations met with no objections from the parties to the treaties or from
the Security Council.

The conclusion that the Court drew from these inferences was that though there
was a growing awareness of the need to liberate the international community of
states and in the international public from the dangers resulting from the existence
of nuclear weapons, it did not believe that a comprehensive and universal cOllventional prohibition had emerged with respect to nuclear weapons.'51
Next, the Court then turned its focus to customary international law. In this
connection its attention was drawn to the policy of deterrence. This was relied on
by states who opposed the Court's declaration that nuclear weapons were illegal, for
it demonstrated that they had reserved their right to self-defence against an armed
attack threatening their vital security interests. The Court expressed its disinclination
to pronounce on the practice though it also slipped in a line in its judgment to the
effect that it was a fact that a number of states adhered to the practise during the Cold
War and continued to do so thereafter.152 It also was unable to state that owing to
the non-use of the weapons for fifty years, there had emerged an opinion juris
relating to the illegality of the weapons.

The Status of the General Assembly Resolutions on Nuclear Weapons
The Court also referred to the various resolutions that had been adopted by the
General Assembly which declared the illegality of nuclear weapons.153 States
differed on the legal effect of these resolutions in respect of their signalling to the
formation of international customary law against the use of nuclear weapons.154 The

150 Opinion on General Assembly Request at para. 62.
151 Ibid. at para. 63.
152 Ibid. at para. 67. See also. infra n. 190 for analysis of the principle of deterrence.
153 See, Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermo-Nuclear Weapons, G.A.
Res. 1653, U. N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961); Non-use of Nuclear
Weapons and Prevention of Nuclear War, G.A. Res. 33nl-B, 33 U.N.GAOR Supp. (No.45) at
48, U.N. Doc. 2/33/45 (1978); G.A. Res. 35/152-0, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 69, U.N.
Doc. A/35/48 (1980); Seea/so, G.A. Res. 2162A, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966).
154 Opinion on General Assembly Request at para. 68.
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Court's ruling in this regard too was prevaricacious. While acknowledging that
certain general assembly resolutions could have normative value, the Court stated
that it was necessary to look to the contents and the conditions of the adoption of
these resolutions as well as if there was an opinion juris existing as to the normative
character of the resolution. Applying these principles to the nuclear resolutions, it
was unable to find that they had established the existence of an opinio juris on the
illegality of the use of such weapons for they had focused on diverse related matters
and were adopted with a substantial number of negative votes and abstentions
(emphasis mine).155 The Court also stated that since the resolutions, especially the
first applied general rules of customary international law to declare the illegality of
nuclear weapons, there was no known prohibition in customary law that prohibited
nuclear weapons, though it revealed the desire of the international community to
take, by a specific and express prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, a
significant step forward along the road to complete nuclear disarmament.156 It is
submitted that the Court erred in ruling so. Even if the resolutions that were adopted
were on diverse matters, the fact remains that they were by the Court's own
admission 'related', to the theme of illegality of nuclear weapons, which they
forcefully propounded.1S? Further despite the 'substantial' number of dissenters and
abstentions, the resolutions received support from nations cutting across 'political
associations' and regional blocs.158 The fact that these resolutions referred to the
then existing principles of customary international law is immaterial for the illegality
of weapons. Through the alliteration of the General Assembly new rules on illegality
of nuclear weapons came into being.159 These resolutiol,ls together with the very
many treaties that the Court had earlier analysed, all pointed to one end, the unlawful
effect of nuclear weapons, which was authority too large to be ignored.160
H. THE PRINCIPLES

OF HUMANITARARIAN

LAW

Not finding any help from either customary or conventional international law ,
the Court turned to international humanitarian law to determine whether it contained
a prohibition on nuclear weapons. The Court's sermon in this regard has been
perhaps the most comprehensive exposition on humanitarian law since the Reser-

155 Ibid. at para. 71.
156 Ibid. at para. 72.
157 Meyrowitz, supra n. 22.
158 Brownlie, supra n. 9.
159 Legal Consequences, supra n. 50; South West Africa, supra n. 49 (separate opinion of Judge
Tanaka), In the view of Bin Cheng, resolutions of the General Assembly that concern science
and technology which the nuclear weapon resolutions are, can transform themselves into
customary international law. This can by anology be applied to nuclear weapons, Cheng, 5 United
Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: Instant Customary International Law, 5 Ind. J. Int'l. L. 23
(1965).

160 See also. B.V.A. Roling, supra n. 22 at 180, 190 - 91.
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vat ions Case.161 After having recalling chronologically the various steps that went
into the making of the rules of warfare that were now called humanitarian law,162
the Court distilled two principles that it believed constituted the "fabric of international humanitarian law". They were:

1.

States must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently
never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and
military targets.

2.

Causing of unnecessary suffering to combatants was prohibited and this meant
that the use of weapons that would cause them such harm or uselessly
aggravate their suffering was unlawful.

The Court also referred to the 'Martens Clause', which meant that civilians and
others who did not get the protection of the any international humanitarian agreements would nonetheless be safeguarded through the international law derived from
the principles of humanity and from dictates of public conscience.163 The Court then
stated authoritatively that the rules enshrined by the conventions in international
humanitarian law were so fundamental that they had to be observed by all states,
whether or not they had ratified the conventions, as the rules constituted
"intransgressible principles of international customary law" .164 At the same time it
did not wish to pronounce on whether the rules had attained the status of peremptory
norms of international law or jus cogens.165 It then proceeded to overrule objections
raised by a 'smaIl minority of states' that because these principles did not deal with
nuclear weapons specifically, they did not apply to them. According to the Court,
such a conclusion, would be incompatible with the intrinsically humanitarian
character of the legal principles in question that permeated the entire law of armed
conflict and applied to all types of weapons.
Importantly, the Court stated that the humanitarian principles applied to
weapons of all time, those of the past, present and future.166 This is no doubt a
161 Reservations to the Genocide Convention, 1951 ICJ 15.
162 Opinion on General Assembly Request at 75 - 77.
163 Ibid. at para. 78. In this regard the Nuremberg Tribunal declared:
"The law of war is to be found not only in treaties, but in customs and practices of states, which
gradually obtained universal recognition, and from the general principles of justice applied by
jurists and practised by military courts. The law is not static, but by continued adoption follows
the needs of a changing world" (emphasis mine)
22 International Military Tribunal, Trial Of The Major War Criminals
Tribunals 464 (1947-49); see also, Singh, supra n. 7 at 60.

Before

International

164 Ibid. at para. 79. Ago, a Justice of the Court, argued that they had indeed attained such a status,
see, Roberto Ago, R. C. A. D. 1. 324 (III, 1971).
165 Ibid. at para. 83.
166 Ibid. at para. 84 - 87. The ruling on this point was in relation to some submissions

made
nuclear weapons had been invented after the principles and rules of humanitarian laws
into existence and that since on twice afterward when they were being revised nuclear
were not covered, these precepts had no application in gauging the validity of nuclear

that since
had come
weapons
weapons.
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significant declaration of international law armed conflict, for it constitutes a far
sighted pronouncement which will mean that if in the future, far more vicious
warfare technology than nuclear weapons is invented, the principles of international
humanitarian law will automatically apply to it.

I. THE PRINCIPLE OF NEUTRALITY
The Court also pronounced on the concept of neutrality in relation to nuclear
weapons. Neutrality was relevant to the case, for it concerned the important fact that
nuclear weapons could not be used in a manner that would affect non belligerent
third states.167 Without much discussion of the concept, and by referring to the
written submissions made by a state in proceedings in relation to the Opinion on the
WHO Request, the Court in awkwardly, stated that international law left no doubt
that the principle of neutrality applied to all nuclear warfare.168

}. THE LEGALITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE LIGHT OF HUMANITARIAN NORMS AND NEUTRALITY
The Court's Conclusions on Legality of Nuclear Weapons vis- a vis humanitarian lLlw
In the light of its discussion on humanitarian law and neutrality the Court
ventured to rule on the legality of nuclear weapons. It stated, perhaps in anticipation
of adverse reaction to its judgment, that the application of the principles that it had
just outlined in relation to nuclear weapons was controversial.169 After referring in
detail to the rival submissions made in this context by parties, the Court stated that
it could not evaluate the view of those states which made out a case for the limited,
contained use of nuclear weapons, without violating the principles of armed conflict,
as the precise circumstances of this use had not been highlighted. 170 In an unimpressive balancing act, unbecoming of the principal judicial organ of the United Nations,
that was founded to save succeeding generations from the scourges of war, the Court
held that it could not make a determination on the validity of the view that the

167 See, Weston, supra n. 22; Meyrowitz, supra n. 22. On the general principles of neutrality, see,
LA. Shearer (Ed.), Starke's
168 In this connection,

International

Nagendra

Law 521 - 530 (1994).

Singh stated:

If the radio-active fallout can be carried by wind hundreds of miles in an unpredictable direction,
the region of nuclear warfare cannot be confined with any precision to the belligerent territories,
and the air and sea which go with them. With the unpredictable and indiscriminate effects of
nuclear bombardments, particularly of the 20 - megaton or higher capacity bombs, the theatre of
war along with its vast area of damaging effects can be spread to any part of the globe, affecting
neutral States and permanently neutralised territories.
Singh, supra n. 7 at 106; see also. Chirnni, supra n. 22 at 146.
169 Opinion on General Assembly

170 Ibid. at para. 94.

Request at para. 90.
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recourse to nuclear weapons would be illegal in any circumstance owing to their
inherent and total incompatibility with the law applicable in armed conflict. Though
the law relating to armed conflict was subject to strict control, which nuclear
weapons by their inherent nature would fail to comply, the Court nonetheless "did
not have sufficient evidence to enable it to conclude with certainty that the use of
nuclear weapons would be necessarily be at variance with the principles and rules
of law applicable in armed conflict in any circumstance",l71 In this connection, it
relied on the 'fundamental right' of every State to survival and thus its right to resort
to self-defence, in accordance with Art. 51 when its survival was at stake.172
Furthermore, the Court referred to the policy of deterrence, which according to it,
an 'appreciable' number of States had adhered to; the reservations that States had
appended to the undertakings in the treaties that sought the elimination and of
nuclear weapons and the declarations made by them during the extension of the NPT
to support its conclusion on this score. Then followed the tragic statement of judicial
helplessness. The Court observed in a declaration of non liquet that:
"[I] n view of the present state of international law viewed as a whole as
examined above by the Court, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the
Court is led to observe that it cannot reach a definitive conclusion as to the
legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a State in an extreme
circumstance of self-defence, in which its very survival would be at stake"173
This ruling that manifested itself as conclusion E, where the infamous sevenseven division in votes of the Justices was recorded. Though seven judges were
content with this statement of law, for which they were lucky to have President
Bedjaoui on their side, the seven other despite their radically differing perceptions
on legality did r.ot approve of the half hearted pronouncement by the Court in this
regard.174
171 Ibid. at para. 95. Judge Herczegh criticised this position by stating that the Court could have given
a more accurate picture of the international law in regard to this important question, see, ibid.
(declaration of Judge Herczech).
172 Ibid. at para. 96.
173 Ibid. at para. 97.
174 Commenting on the sharp partition of opinion on this crucial issue, President Bedjaoui was at
pains to stress that it did not rep'•.esent any geographical dividing line. According to him, the fact
that the Court was unable to go any further was not to be interpreted as leaving the way open
to the recognition of the lawfulness of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, see, ibid. (declaration
of President Bedjaoui). Judge Vereshchetin, took a slightly different approach. In his view,
through the advisory opinion, the Court was not requested to resolve an actual dispute, but to state
the law as it found it. This law even if imperfect, could not be supplemented or improved upon,
see, ibid. (declaration of Judge Vereshchetin). Judge Ranjeva after stating that he was indeed
satisfied that the Court did declare the law and lay down some boundaries for State action, hoped
that no Court would ever have to reach the same conclusion as above, see, ibid. (septJ'ate opinion
of Judge Ranjeva). One of the most virulent criticisms of the holding came from Vice President
Schwebel. He chided the majority for having concluded on the supreme issue of the threat or use
'of force of our age that it had no opinion. This was after months of scanning through the law.
According to the Judge if this Wasto be the ultimate holding of the Court it would have been
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The Declaration of Non Liquet
The declaration of non liquet by the Court is clearly out of line with its previous
jurisprudence.175 and indeed international judicial practise in general.176 In his
seminal writing on the subject, Sir Herch Lauterpacht opined that international
courts have a duty never to refuse to give a decision on the ground that the law is
non - existent, controversial or uncertain or lacking in clarity. In this regard, he relied
on universal arbitral practise and judicial practise, the principles of customary
international law and the principle of completeness of the legal order.177 The
abdication of its judicial function by the Court is indeed regrettable, for it is not
befitting of its stature and position in the UN Charter as the principal arbiter of all
international disputes or for that matter guardian of the legality of the United Nations
system.178 A tribunal cannot run away from a situation by stating that it is not
governed by law, it must seek to apply existing legal rules by modifying them

better to have declined to render an opinion at all., see, ibid (dissenting opinion of Judge
Schwebel). Judge Shahabuddeen was also of the opinion that one way or the other, the Court
should have given its opinion on the matter for though the question was a difficult one, it was
its responsibility
to answer it, see, ibid. (dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
Judge
W eeramantry' s forceful dissent advocating the complete illegality of nuclear weapons also found
fault with the Court's not reply lacking conviction and clarity, see, ibid. (dissenting opinion of
Judge Weeramantry).
According to Judge Koroma, the judgment of the Court was not only
untenable in law, but was even potentially destabilising of the existing international legal order.
He also undertook the task of analysing the material before the Court on which it had based its
ruling, which left him wholly unconvinced with regard to need for an inconclusive verdict. see,
ibid. (dissenting opinion of Judge Koroma). The declaration of non liquet was also opposed by
Rosalyn Higgins, see, ibid., (dissenting opinion of Judge Higgins). In this regard Higgins was
merely reiterating her earlier opinion as a publicist, see, Higgins, The Policy Consideration and
the International Judicial Process, 17 Int'l. & Compo 1. Q. 58 at 67 -71 (1968) (considering the
arguments and authorities against the declaration of non liquet).
175 In the Barcelona Traction Case, the Court proceeded to decide the matter even though there were
no readily applicable rules, see, Barcelona Case, supra n. 28. See also, H. Thiriway, The Law and
Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960 - 1989, 609 Brit. Y. B. Int'l. 1. 1 at 76.
Where the Court has declined to express a view in the past, these have been for matters that are
beyond the realm of law, like in Haye de la Torre, in which the Court expressed its inability to
give advise on something that it believed was beyond its judicial limits, see, Haye de la Torre,
1951 ICJ 71 at 83, see also, International Status of South West Africa Case (Advisory Opinion),
1950lCJ 128 at 140.

176 See, Draft Articles on Abitral Procedure, Art. 12, [1958] 2 Y.B. Int'l 1. Comm'n 8; Desranges
V. lLO, 20 ILR 523 at 530 (1953) (impermissibility
of non liquet, a fun'damental tenet of all legal
systems); Oil Fields of Texas V. Iran, 69 ILR 565 at 581, 594 (1989)
(development
of
international law has always been a process of applying
circumstances
not previously encountered).

such established

legal principles

to

177 H, Lauterpacht, Some Observation on the Prohibition of Non Liquet and the Completeness of the
Legal Order in I International Law: Herch Lauterpach' S Collected Papers - (Part I) 213 (E.
Lauterpacht ed., 1975). But see, J.Stone, Non Uquet and the Function of Law in the International
Community, 35 Brit. Y. B. Int'1. 1. 124 (1959).

178 Opinion on General Assembly Request (dissenting opinion of Judge Koroma).But cf T.Pranck,
supra n. 104 .
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appropriately.179 The ICJ, through its Statute, is given a wide variety of sources to
choose from, including municipal law and writings and jurists and therefore cannot
claim that it cannot find the law, indeed, as Judge Alvarez put it:
It now happens that with greater frequency, no applicable precepts are to be
fond or that those which do exist present lacunae. In all such cases, the Court
must develop the law of nations and create new principles.180
According to him, these principles owed their origin to the legal conscience
of the people that resulted from social and international life. It is submitted that non
- committal pronouncements
such as these undermine judicial integrity of
international institutions. If the Court really had to come to such a conclusion it need
not have decided to answer the question in the first place, there are no marks in
international law for abstentions by judicial bodies.181

Humanitarian Norms and the Use of Nuclear Weapons
Apart from the technical objections on the basis of non liquet, the Court's
faltering on illegality after it paid obeisance to the sacred nature of humanitarian
laws, is utterly unjustified. As John Fried as argued that:
"[I] t is scurrilous to argue that it is still forbidden to kill a single innocent
enemy civilian with a bayonet, or wantonly to destroy a single building or
enemy territory by machine-gun fire, but that it is legitimate to kill millions
of enemy non-combatants and wantonly to destroy entire enemy cities, regions
and perhaps countries by nuclear weapons."182
Humanitarian norms are all compassing, they cannot have any exceptions even
in the case of self defence. For instance Art. 48 of the Additional Protocol to the
Geneva Conventions states that parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish
between civilian population and civilian objects.IS3 Further since they have been

179 Oppenheim's

eigth edition states in relation to non liquet:

"[E) very international situation is capable of being determined as a matter of law either by the
application of specific legal rules where they already exist, or by the application of legal rules
where they already exist, or by the application of legal rules derived by the use of known legal
techniques from other legal rules or principles. It is thus not permissible for an international
tribunal to pronounce a non liquet, i.e. to for an invoke the absence of clear legal rules applicable
to a dispute as a reason for declining to give judgment."
Oppenheim,

supra n. 109 at 13.

180 Fisheries Case (United KingdcmINorway),

1951 ICJ 116 at 145 (separate

opinion

of Judge

Alvarez).
181 Opinion on General Assembly Request (dissenting

opinion of Schwebel).

182 J. Fried, cited in Weston, supra n. 22.
183 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, 1125 UNTS 3. Interestingly, the Indian delegation to the drafting of the Protocol, argued that the Protocol directly
resulted in a ban on nuclear weapons, see, GRIEF, supra n. 6.
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recognised as been recognised as 'universal binding customary principles' , they
must operate in all circumstances. 184This position seems to be ignored in the strange
bundle of logic adopted by the Court. If the use of nuclear weapons is generally
contrary to the rules of humanitarian law,185 how this view can suddenly change
even in relation to the extreme case of self defence seems to be unclear.t86 This
means that the spray of illegality that humanitarian law normally paints over nuclear
weapons, may not exist in relation to a situation of self defence according to the
Court. This contradicts the law on Art. 51 itself that requires actions taken under it
to be proportional which has been interpreted to mean observance of the humanitarian rules of warfare.187 The Court therefore is in error for making a potential use
of the weapons without the cover of humanitarian law, where the survival of the state
was at stake, which would have otherwise prohibited its use.188 Indeed the danger
of such a open-ended ruling is great. As Judge Koroma points out that it not only
enables States that might be inclined to use such weapons to become judges of the
situation and determine for themselves the lawfulness of the use of the weapons, but
also throws into doubt the regulation of use of force and by the Charter.

The Policy of Deterrence
The reliance placed by the Court on the principle of deterrence also seems
faulty.189 It is a practise whereby a few States have believed that through their
superiority in weapons and their will to use them, others will be dissuaded against
attacking them for there willbe mutually assured destruction.190 Deterrence has

184 See, International Military Tribunal, supra n. 163 at 497.
185 See, supra n. 166.
186 In this context, Judge Koroma in his separate opinion found fault with the Court's qualifying its
declaration of illegality by the term 'generally', see, ibid., (dissenting opinion of Judge Koroma).
187 J.G. Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 Am. J. Int'!. L. 391 (1993).
188 See, Falk, et al., supra n. 22, Mani, supra n. 6. Judge Weeramantry's vigorous dissent in this case
went to great lengths to demonstrate that the use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance was
illegal. In this regard, Weeramantry relied primarily on the humanitarian norms, especially in
relation to· the horrendous effects of nuclear weapons. Apart from modern day practise and
conventional texts, he drew upon the multicultural and ancient traditions especially in Hinduism,
Buddhism, Chinese culture, Judaism, Islam, Africa and Europe to demonstrate the universal and
age old nature of humanitarian roles, .see, Opinion on General Assembly Request (dissenting
opinion of Judge Weeramantry).
189 It was roundly criticised by Judge Shi, who stated it had no legal value in relation to customary
international law. The Court's taking into account it was hardly in tune with judicial function.
Further, the states that had adhered to the policy by no means constituted a large proportion of
the membership of the international community. Judge Shi was also of the opinion that giving
any credence to this principle would be contrary to the sovereign equality of nations as enshrined
in the Charter, see, Ibid. (opinion of Judge Shi). Judge Guillaume noted that since the judgment
of the Court took into account the policy of deterrence it amounted to recognition of its legality,
see, ibid. (dissenting opinion of Judge Guillaume).
190 H,H, Almond, Deterrence and a Policy Oriented Perspective on the Legality of Nuclear
Weapons, in Nuclear Weapons And International Law, supra n. 22 at 57, 67.
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been in vogue ever since World War II ended, practised especially by the USA and
the erstwhile USSR. Some scholars have pointed to the fact that this doctrine has
prevented nuclear wars from Uiking place, which seems to have weighed the mind
of the Court.191 But as Meyrowitz, points out, that in some sense this deterrence
threatens every person in the world directly or indirectly. Boyle, a publicist, makes
out a forceful case as to why deterrence itself is illegal as a policy relying on arts.
2 (4) and 51 of the UN Charter and the Nuremberg Principles, by showing that the
nations that practise it have crossed the rubicon of mere possession and have
prepared and deployed their weapon system for immediate use in war.192 This
position is also echoed by Brownlie who believes that since the deterrent principle
rests on the threat of massive retaliation, it would lead to a lack of proportionality
which would not fall within the customary rule of self defence. 193 This was because
nuclear weapons were qualitatively different from conventional weapons and their
effects were so devastating that gave no time for negotiation or mediation.194 The
nuclear peace that deterrence has brought is tenuous and fragile for the United States
has often contemplated the use of nuclear weapons.195
K. OBLIGATION

TO NE(;()TIATE

NUCLEAR

DISARMAMENT

In an effort perhaps to assuage its judicial conscience for ruling in the manner
that it did above, the Court embarked on an unusual exercise to examine "one further
aspect of the question before it seen it in a broader context" .196 It ruled that since
in the long run, international law and with it the stability of international order was
bound to suffer from the continuing difference of views with regard to the legal
status of nuclear weapons, the long promised complete nuclear disarmament appeared to be an appropriate goal for world community. In this context, it referred
to the aspirations expressed in the NPT to the effect that there was an obligation on

191 See, Rostow supra n. 6 at 177, n. 158; Burroughs, supra n. 6 at 45; W. M.Reisman, Deterrence
and International Law in Miller and Feinrider (Eds.) Nuclear Weapons And International Law
129, supra n. 22 ; K.Bailey, Why We Have to Keep the Bomb, Bull. Atom. Scin'ts. 30 (JanlFeb
1995).
192 F.A. Boyle, The Relevance of International Law to the Paradox of Nuclear Deterrence, 80 N.
Y. U. L. Rev. 1407 (1986). In response to the fact that deterrence has been assiduously been
pursued by some nations, Boyle states that "a small band of criminals never have been permitted
to argue that their lawless conduct destroys the validity of the very laws they have violated, ibid.
at 1445.
193 Brownlie,

supra n. 9 at 446 - 447.

194 Brownlie, International Law And Use Of Force 262 - 263 (1963). He also n.s that the
proportionality doctrine suffers from an infirmity in that it may require a response where there
has been no real threat either due to an accident of mistake or even unauthorised attack., id.
195 Meyrowitz, supra n. 22; The Opinions of Legal Scholars on the Legal Status of Nuclear Weapons,
supra n. 22; Chimni, supra n. 22 at 138.

196 Opinion on General Assembly Request at para. 98.
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the parties to negotiate in good faith, a nuclear disarmament.197 According to the
Court, the legal import of this obligation went beyond that of a mere responsibility
of conduct, and instead endeavoured to reach a particular result, that of nuclear
disarmament in all its aspects, through the vehicle of negotiations in good faith.198
It was at pains to state that any realistic search for general and complete disarmament
had to have the co-operation of all States, which was an objective of vital importance
to the whole of the international community.199 The implications that this declaration of the Court will have in relation to disarmament efforts, like the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) that are criticised as discriminatory and half hearted by
some nations, especially India are must be taken note of.2oOJudging from the tenor
and the language used by the Court in its judgment, it is apparent that the efforts at
disarmament must be full and effective in relation to the goal of complete disarmament. If the CTBT falls short of this, then it would not be incumbent on the States
concerned to co-operate with the efforts at negotiation. Whether the CTBT actually
can be described as a step in the direction of complete and total disarmament is
beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, if the CTBT or any other measure does
not assure complete disarmament, then it would not be incumbent upon states to take
part in the negotiations in this regard.201
CONCLUSION
The advisory opinions of the ICJ are no doubt important milestones in the
judicial path that the World Court embarked upon. Their significance is also
pronounced in light of the fact that the opinions have come at a time, when the Court
is in its fiftieth year of its existence. While generally advisory opinions of the Court
are not supposed to have any formal legal effect, like a judgment in relation to a
contentious case in relation to the parties concerned, it would be hardly possible to
deny the fact that the ones delivered in relation to nuclear weapons lack definitive

197 Art. VI reads:
Each of the parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear anTIS race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control.
198

Opinion on General Assembly

Request at para. 99 - 100.

199 Ibid. at para. 103.
200

On the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, see generally, Spurgeon M. Keeny & Craig Cerniello,
The CTB Treaty: A Historic Opportunity To Strengthen the Non - Proliferation Regime, Arms
Control 15 (Aug 1996); Hisham Zerriffi & Arjun Makhijani, The Stewardship Smokescreen, Bull.
Atom Scin'ts. 22 (Sep/Oct 1996); P,Bidwai & A. Vanaik, Testing Times: The Global Stake In
A Nuclear Test Ban (1996).

201

See, H. A. Gould, Is India really the CTBT 'spoiler', The Economic Times, Bangalore (Aug 6
1996). G. Balachandran, The Fight Over a Treaty, The Economic Times, Madras (lun 16 1996).

But see, P.Bidwai. Toads under a Nuclear Mushroom, The Economic Times, Madras (Iun 23,
1996).
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legal effect. Several of the Court's pronouncements are n.worthy and constitute
important statements in relation to the nature and the content of contemporary norms
of public international law . These include the comments on the law of international
institutions, the nature of use of force and self defence in the UN Charter, international environmental principles and humanitarian law. Even the unprecedented
declaration of non liquet was viewed by one Justice as an endorsement of the
position that States may resort to the threat or use of nuclear weapons in an extreme
circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at
stake.202

In the light of the division of the Court on other points, it would seem that the
most important declaration made by the Court in these two cases was the unanimous
ruling of all the Justices that there exists an obligation in international law to ensure
that negotiations are undertaken towards the goal of complete nuclear disarmament.
The significance of this part of the Court's judgment, can be witnessed in the fact
that a few weeks after it was pronounced, the controversial CTBT was passed, to
which India dissented sharply by stating inter alia that there was no time frame
towards the complete abolition of nuclear weapons. More such controversies are
bound to erupt and the import of the ruling of the Court will be the subject of
considerable discussion both in academia and by States in various fora.
The Court walked a tight rope in the opinions that it delivered. However, it
cannot be excused for the manner in which it declared its inability to rule on the
legality question definitely. Nuclear weapons are the most horrendous of all man's
creations and they cannot be condoned under the veil of State sovereignty. As
Chimni remarks, no legal system can confer on its members the right to annihilate
the community which engenders it and whose activities it seeks to regulate. In other
words, there cannot be a legal rule which permits the threat or use of nuclear
weapons.203 It does not help for the Court to say that since it could not find such
a rule, it had to hesitate on whether it existed. The citizens of the world possess a
universal right to peace that is enunciated in glowing terms in the Charter and the
threat and use of nuclear weapons constitutes an obstacle in their enjoyment of the
right.204 It is fervently hoped that the Court's hiccup in this respect does not lead
to disastrous consequences for humanity.

202 Opinion on General Assembly Request, (separate opinion of Judge Guillaume).
203 Chimni, supra n. 22 at 142.
204 A.A. TItikhonov, The Inter-Relationship between the Right to Life and Right to Peace: Nuclear
Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Right to Life in B.G.Ramcharan (Ed.),
The Right To Life In International Law 97 (1985).

